Editor’s Note:
This article is the third and final installment in our After the Collapse series. In Part I, The Death of Guarantees, we examined how Ukraine and Taiwan’s security realities shattered the illusion of a dependable rules-based order. Part II, Deterrence Without Permission, explored Israel and Armenia—two small nations facing existential threats without reliable allies or institutional protection. Here in Part III, we draw the lessons together, mapping what survival in this Darwinian landscape actually looks like. While designed to conclude the series, this piece stands on its own for readers encountering these ideas for the first time. For the full article including all three parts you can check it out here.
From Illusion to Realism: The Journey of Small Nations
Recap Paragraph:
Over the course of the first two installments, we traced the journey from the illusion of collective security to the harsh pragmatism of self-reliance. Part I, “The Death of Guarantees,” showed how Ukraine’s experience with the Budapest Memorandum and Taiwan’s precarious position under “strategic ambiguity” revealed the fragility of promises. Part II, “Deterrence Without Permission,” examined how Israel’s lone strikes on Iran and Armenia’s defeat in Nagorno-Karabakh exposed the limits of both great-power alliances and multilateral institutions. Taken together, these cases make clear that the rules-based order’s safety net has been torn away—leaving small nations to survive on their own skill, will, and adaptability.
Introduction – What Remains After Collapse
The post-WWII rules-based order hasn’t merely weakened—it has been stripped of its core function. In Part I, we watched Ukraine discover that signed memoranda and NATO aspirations could not stop a Russian tank. Taiwan learned that “strategic ambiguity” can feel like strategic abandonment. Part II showed how Israel has survived by acting alone—striking Iran’s nuclear program without global permission—while Armenia discovered that Western diplomatic support can evaporate under the pressure of drones and hybrid warfare.
In this final part, we confront the brutal clarity that remains once illusions are gone. Survival now belongs to nations willing to think like strategic predators, not idealistic wards of a benevolent order. Whether or not you’ve read the earlier installments, the lesson is universal: in today’s geopolitical jungle, the burden of survival has shifted entirely onto the shoulders of the small nation itself.
From Illusion to Realism
A Ukrainian soldier, a Taiwanese hacker, an Israeli spy, an Armenian villager – these disparate figures share a grim understanding forged in the flames of the new world disorder. The quaint idea that international law, institutions, or distant great power guarantees will shield the vulnerable has been interred in Mariupol’s ruins, Taiwan’s uncertainty, Israel’s lone operations, and Armenia’s exodus. What replaces that order is not pure chaos but a brutal clarity: a world where each nation truly lives on its wits and will. The fog of comforting illusion has burned off, revealing a Darwinian landscape beneath.
Survival in this environment does not mean abandoning all cooperation or morality. It means anchoring on reality. And reality says: global “rules” exist only if someone strong enforces them, alliances hold only as long as interests align, and aggressors will be deterred only by superior power or the credible threat of it. Small nations must therefore undertake a great mental rearmament. They must think like survivalists in a wild terrain, not like citizens of a safe rule-bound garden (for the garden’s fence has fallen).
The Three Pillars of Survival
What does survival look like now? First and foremost, it looks like self-help. Every case study we explored underscores that nations must build the capacity to defend their own sovereignty. This means investing in hard defense capabilities: weapons, technology, citizen training, cyber resilience, etc. Defense capability is the bedrock – without it, pleas for help ring hollow or arrive too late. As the old Latin proverb goes, si vis pacem, para bellum (“if you want peace, prepare for war”). Ukraine’s renewed independence, Taiwan’s continued de facto autonomy, Israel’s very existence, even Armenia’s chance to live another day – all hinge on how well they prepare for the next threat.
Next, civil resilience becomes crucial. Modern conflict targets societies, not just armies. Thus, nations must cultivate unity, adaptability, and the will to endure hardships. Ukraine’s ability to absorb Russia’s blows owed much to a unified identity and social resolve – civilians supporting the war effort, adapting businesses to conflict needs, maintaining morale under bombardment. Taiwan is similarly fostering a resilient society that could keep functioning under blockade or cyber onslaught. Israel has long knitted a high-resilience society through drills, public education, and a culture that treats each citizen as a first responder in crises. Armenia’s society, too, showed remarkable cohesion in adversity; though defeated, it didn’t disintegrate. In a world where adversaries might cut power grids or spread disinformation to break a nation’s will, a prepared populace is as vital as prepared soldiers.
Third, foreign policy independence is key. Small states can no longer put all eggs in one patron’s basket and call it a day. The U.S. umbrella is not automatic; the Russia umbrella turned out to be made of paper; China’s offers come with strings. Therefore, nimble diplomacy is needed – engaging multiple powers, forming regional alliances, participating in new groupings that address specific needs (like energy security, intelligence sharing, etc.). Think of it as diversifying survival tools: a nation wants a toolkit of relationships so that if one fails, others can fill gaps. This also means not antagonizing potential friends unnecessarily – pragmatic engagement over ideological alignment. During the Cold War, being in one camp offered clarity of support. In today’s more fluid multipolar world, hedging and balancing are back in play for small states, much as they were in older multipolar eras.
Leveraging Assets for Strategic Relevance
Fourth, nations should leverage any unique assets they have to increase their strategic value to others. For example, Taiwan’s semiconductor industry isn’t just an economic engine; it’s a geopolitical lever – the world needs its chips, which subtly increases global incentive to prevent its destruction (the “Silicon Shield” concept). Ukraine’s agricultural exports make it important to global food security – giving Europe and others a stake in its stability. Israel turned itself into a tech and cyber powerhouse – now even countries that don’t love its politics find it useful (selling drones to Azerbaijan or cyber tools to various states). Armenia has fewer such cards, but perhaps its diaspora and location as a corridor between Iran and Eurasia could be leveraged. The point is, if you can’t be strong, be useful. It raises the cost to others of abandoning you.
In embracing this realist new normal, small nations must confront a hard choice: hope the world still works as it used to, or prepare for how it works now. Hope is seductive; one can continue to speak the language of universal rights and mutual security and pray that the better angels of human nature prevail. But hope, as we have seen, is a poor shield against missiles and tanks. Preparation is arduous and expensive, but it at least stacks the odds a bit less unfavorably. Preparation means building arsenals, yes, but also mental preparedness – educating citizens that peace is not given, it is earned and guarded vigilantly.
One might ask: are we sliding back into a darker age of constant wars and no norms at all? Not necessarily. In fact, the very clarity of this post-order world can be stabilizing in its own way, if states internalize the new rules of survival. It’s a colder, more Hobbesian equilibrium, but there can be equilibrium. It just rests on deterrence and balance rather than collective security and goodwill. Think of it as a return to classical geopolitics – spheres of influence, armed neutrality, power bargains – after a holiday from history that lasted 75 years. The optimism of the 1990s is gone, but perhaps a wiser realism can replace it, one that avoids both naïveté and needless belligerence.
What of morality and justice, then? Are they doomed to be trampled? Not if those who cherish them also wield strength. As the Roman general Vegetius famously noted, “Let him who desires peace prepare for war.” In a twist of fate, those who want a more just world must now equip themselves to fight for it (literally or figuratively). Soft power alone won’t cut it. The age of the warrior-scholar-statesman may be returning – leaders who can navigate ruthless power politics while still lighting a candle for higher principles, and crucially, backing those principles with credible force.
The collapse of the old order is not the end of civilization; it is a call to adapt or perish. Oswald Spengler, reflecting on why civilizations decline, observed that often it’s a failure to respond creatively to new challenges that seals their fate[45][46]. Arnold Toynbee similarly wrote, “Civilizations die from suicide, not by murder.”[45][46] In other words, external threats alone rarely destroy a society; it’s the internal inability to meet the threat that does it. Small nations today have a choice: succumb to despair and dependency (a form of civilizational suicide), or reinvent themselves for rugged self-reliance (choosing life). The Western-led order’s collapse is a blow, but not the end. It simply means the safety net is gone; now it’s tightrope walking with no net below. Scary, yes, but also focusing.
In this new world, power respects power. Patience and preparation pay off (as China shows). Promises and ideals, unless backed by iron, are “but words”[28]. The jungle is growing back, as Kagan warned, and in the jungle one must cultivate sharp thorns or partner with a strong tree for shelter. The small nations that will survive and thrive are those who internalize this reality fast. They will arm themselves, train their people to endure, seek friends without illusions, and above all, never surrender their fate entirely to others. They will do as the old Bedouin saying advises: “Trust in God, but tie up your camel.” In modern terms: believe in principles, but lock and load just in case.
The era of the rules-based order may be over, but a new era of clear-eyed strategic realism is being born. It will be unforgiving to the foolish yet rewarding to the wise. Let the small nations take heed: history’s jungle rewards not the strongest per se, but the most adaptable. Adapting now means acting as if each nation stands alone – and paradoxically, by doing so, finding the solidarity of those who also stand strong. A coalition of the willing, not in the sense of ideological crusades, but in the sense of nations willing to stand on their own feet and assist each other out of strength, not weakness.
The final image is perhaps this: a return to an older balance where courage and cunning mattered as much as constitutions and charters. It’s not a prospect to cheer, but neither is it doom. It is simply reality, roaring back. And reality, as ever, rewards those who face it squarely. As Thomas Hobbes soberly reminded us long ago, in a world without a common power, “the notions of right and wrong have no place… force and fraud are the two cardinal virtues”[47][48]. We need not embrace cynicism, but we must not indulge in fantasy. In the end, the small nations that persist will be those that learn the law of the jungle – and then, through strength and savvy, transcend it enough to protect what they hold dear.
Epilogue – The Return to History
Let us hope the leaders of today’s vulnerable states heed these survival lessons. The jungle is here, but with iron will and perhaps a dash of luck, they can endure until a new, more just garden might be cultivated again. In the meantime, keep your powder dry and your alliances close, for the night is dark and full of terrors – and dawn, though delayed, comes only to those who last through the night.
For small nations, survival now demands:
• Independent defense capacity
• Civil resilience against information warfare
• Foreign policy built on realism, not hope
As Spengler warned, civilizations die not from war but from forgetting why they existed. For the small nations of today, survival is no longer granted. It must be earned—alone.
The West believed it had transcended history. But history has returned—with iron teeth.
“Small nations have two options: hope the world still works as it used to—or prepare for how it works now.”
Conclusion – From Lessons to Doctrine
With Ukraine, Taiwan, Israel, and Armenia as our case studies, the verdict is clear: hope is no longer a strategy. Defense capacity, societal resilience, and diplomatic independence are no longer luxuries—they are survival prerequisites.
These lessons do not end with military or diplomatic doctrine; they point to deeper structural weaknesses in the international system. In our next investigation, we turn to a critical and uncomfortable truth: the very institutions built to safeguard the rules-based order are now being repurposed by authoritarian blocks to weaken sovereign states from within. Understanding this quiet form of warfare is as essential for survival as any missile defense system.
Notes for parts 1 through 3
[1] [2] The Jungle Grows Back: America and Our Imperiled World | Brookings
[3] Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order | The Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
[4] Is the U.S. Abandoning the World Order It Created? | RAND
[5] Topic: Relations with Ukraine – NATO
[6] [16] [17] The Budapest Memorandum 1994 After 30 Years: Non-Proliferation Success Overshadowed by NATO Blowup Then, Russian War on Ukraine Now | National Security Archive
[7] [35] [36] [37] [43] The Armenia and Azerbaijan Conflict is a Test of International Norms: The United States is Failing
[8] Chinese Security Contractors in Africa
[9] [10] Chinese firm pays $584 million in Sri Lanka port debt-to-equity deal | Reuters
[11] China’s African port interests are expanding. Is the PLA Navy next …
[12] [PDF] The U.S.-China Strategic Competition – Aspen Institute
[13] Danger Zone: The Coming Conflict with China – AEI
[14] [15] China far outpacing US in military, commercial ship numbers
[18] Victory in Ukraine Starts with Addressing Five Strategic Problems
[19] Strategic Clarity: An Argument for Effective Deterrence – DKI APCSS
[20] [22] [23] Report: China, Russia, Cuba Running for Seats on U.N. Human Rights Council – UN Watch
[21] United Nations Human Rights Council – Wikipedia
[24] [25] UN Condemns Israel 17 Times, Rest of World Combined 6 Times – UN Watch
[26] [27] Francesca Albanese’s Ten Most Terrible Moments in July 2025 – UN Watch
[28] Covenants, without the sword, are but words and… – Goodreads
[29] The Real Story of Stuxnet – IEEE Spectrum
[30] U.N. Council Condemns Israeli Raid – The Washington Post
[31] Netanyahu: Israel Will Act Alone If Necessary To Prevent Iranian Nuclear Threat – The Media Line
[32] Netanyahu at UNGA: Israel will ‘stand alone’ to prevent nuclear Iran
[33] Drones in the Nagorno-Karabakh War: Analyzing the Data
[34] [44] Azerbaijan using Israeli “kamikaze drones” in Nagorno-Karabakh …
[38] [40] [41] [42] Israeli arms, drones quietly helped Azerbaijan retake Nagorno …
[39] Turkish And Israeli Drones’ Big Impact On Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict
[45] Christopher Quigley: Civilizations die by suicide, not by murder
[46] Arnold J. Toynbee – Civilizations die from suicide, not by…
Editor’s Note: This article is the third and final part of our ‘After the Collapse’ series. While it can be read as a stand-alone analysis, it builds on themes explored in Part I (‘The Death of Guarantees: Ukraine, Taiwan, and the End of the Rules-Based Order’) and Part II (‘Deterrence Without Permission: Israel, Armenia, and the Hollowing of Global Institutions’). Readers are encouraged to review those pieces for the full context.
For readers who wish to revisit the previous instalments, Part I examines the collapse of security guarantees for small nations, and Part II explores how states adapt—or fail—in a world where institutions no longer safeguard sovereignty.
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