In two very different conflicts on opposite sides of the world, a common theme has emerged: small drones, often repurposed or improvised by frontline fighters, have transformed modern warfare. A pro-Kremlin commentator lamented early on, “all military experts talked about the need to build ever more powerful, long-range drones… But in Ukraine…the most useful drone is a trifle – quadcopters” . This recognition captures a shift from traditional top-down military learning to a bottom-up, soldier- driven innovation paradigm. Nowhere is this more evident than in the ongoing Ukraine–Russia war and the Israel–Gaza conflict, where ingenuity from the trenches and streets is driving battlefield adaptation faster than military bureaus ever could.
In this article, we explore how frontline creativity and civilian initiative have upended conventional military procurement and doctrine, with drones as the focal point. We first contrast top-down and bottom-up military learning, then trace the evolution of small drone use in Ukraine and Gaza. We examine how grassroots innovations have improved frontline survivability, from Ukrainian reconnaissance and strike tactics to Israeli infantry using mini-drones in urban combat. Next, we delve into the remarkable shift from centralized procurement to soldier- and civilian-led drone acquisition via donations and crowdfunding. Finally, we discuss the strategic and tactical implications of these developments for the future of warfare.
Top-Down vs. Bottom-Up Military Learning
Modern militaries have traditionally relied on top-down innovation: high-level commanders, defense ministries, and industry R&D dictate what new technologies and tactics reach the troops. Wartime experience, however, often flips this script. Scholars note that while peacetime innovation tends to be top-driven, wartime adaptation originates on the frontlines . Under fire, junior officers and enlisted soldiers continuously improvise – modifying equipment, inventing tactics, and rapidly “learning by doing” in order to survive and overcome immediate challenges. These bottom-up innovations are later analyzed and sometimes institutionalized by the higher-ups, but they begin as field expedients born of necessity .
This dynamic has been observed in past conflicts like Iraq and Afghanistan, where troops jury-rigged armor to vehicles or developed novel counter-IED tactics long before formal doctrine caught up . Military organizational learning theorists describe this as a tension between “single-loop” learning (tweaking methods within existing rules) and “double-loop” learning (changing the rules themselves) . Small frontline fixes (single-loop) are usually accepted quickly, but deeper changes that challenge institutional norms (double-loop) often meet resistance . For example, U.S. forces in Iraq faced deadly roadside bombs for years before leadership finally embraced the bottom-up push for Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles – a change so fundamental it required outside political pressure .
Bottom-up military learning can be powerful but needs top-down support to scale up. A Defense Acquisition University article likened frontline innovators to entrepreneurs solving specific problems, in contrast to bureaucracy’s habit of pushing tech solutions in search of a problem . Crucially, it
argued that “bottom-up innovators and top-down leaders need each other equally. Neither can succeed alone.” Successful innovation in war thus demands a balance: empower the troops to experiment, and empower the brass to recognize and propagate the best ideas. In the Ukraine and Gaza conflicts, this balance is playing out in real time – with bottom-up ingenuity often sprinting ahead of top-down institutions.
Evolution of Small Drones on the Frontlines
Both the Ukraine–Russia war and the Israel–Gaza war have been dubbed “drone wars” due to the prolific use of unmanned aerial vehicles, especially small commercial quadcopters and improvised drones. However, this phenomenon did not start as a carefully planned top-down strategy. It evolved from the ground up, as soldiers and militants on the frontlines figured out how to turn inexpensive drones into decisive tools. Here we trace that evolution in each conflict.
Ukraine: From Hobby Toys to War Winners
When Russia first invaded Ukraine in 2014, and even in the early stages of the full-scale invasion in 2022, neither army was fully prepared for the massive role small drones would play. At first, Ukrainian fighters scrounged off-the-shelf drones to augment their limited reconnaissance abilities. For example, the Chinese-made DJI Mavic quadcopter – essentially a civilian camera drone – was being used on the Donbas frontlines, despite costing around $2,000 and having to be purchased largely out-of- pocket by Ukrainian soldiers . These early drones, obtained through personal funds or volunteer donations, proved their worth by providing cheap aerial eyes in the sky for scouting enemy positions
. Even Russian troops, facing bureaucratic delays in supply, have frequently crowdfunded DJI drones on their own – an ironic twist where soldiers of a superpower raise money online for gear, as one analyst noted of Russian units “always fundraising for DJI Mavic drones” to use at the front .
Russia’s all-out invasion in 2022 dramatically accelerated drone innovation on the Ukrainian side. Suddenly, thousands of commercial drones were pulled into wartime service. The most common platform became first-person-view (FPV) racing drones – small quadcopters that pilots fly via goggles as if they were in the drone’s cockpit . These FPV drones cost only a few hundred dollars yet could deliver grenades or act as loitering munitions. Ukrainian fighters rapidly iterated on designs: initially tiny 7-inch models in 2022, scaling up to 13-inch versions by 2024 to carry larger payloads . The adaptability of the basic quadcopter frame turned it into a “universal platform” – attach a camera and it’s a spy drone, attach a bomb and it’s a mini bomber, attach a relay antenna and it extends communication networks . By adding modular AI chips and optical sensors, some Ukrainian FPVs were even given the ability to autonomously navigate or lock onto targets, enhancing their strike accuracy .
Other creative battlefield innovations followed. Ukraine, being a major agricultural country, repurposed heavy crop-spraying drones (nicknamed “Baba Yaga” drones) to drop large explosive payloads, leveraging their high lift capacity . Engineers also developed “mothership” drones – fixed-wing craft that carry multiple small FPV drones and release them near the target like a dispenser . To strike deep behind enemy lines, teams turned hobby kit airplanes and obsolete Soviet-era UAVs into long- range kamikaze drones, reportedly reaching targets hundreds of kilometers away . Ukrainian President Zelensky even claimed some homegrown long-range drones could hit targets up to 3,000 km distant – a range previously associated only with cruise missiles.
This rapid bottom-up evolution has made the Ukraine war “the world’s first drone war”, as observers widely acknowledge . Drones now permeate every aspect of operations. Tiny quadcopters account
for an estimated majority of battlefield casualties by directing artillery or dropping grenades, fundamentally changing tactics . Tanks and armored vehicles cannot survive near the front without makeshift cage armor (“cope cages”) and electronic jammers, and even then large concentrations of armor are too vulnerable to drone swarms . Both sides have resorted to dispersing into small infantry squads often on motorcycles or ATVs, since any big grouping of troops or vehicles invites drone attack . As one Ukrainian drone pilot put it, “modern warfare now demands rapid tactical shifts and near-immediate deployment of new technologies, often moving straight from blueprint to battlefield” . Nowhere has this been more apparent than in Ukraine’s drone-filled skies.
Gaza: Drones in the Urban Battlefield
Israel is a world leader in military drones at the high end – from the 1980s onwards the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) pioneered larger surveillance and strike UAVs. Yet at the small tactical level, Israel, like others, was initially slow to adopt tiny drones for infantry use . Before the recent Gaza war, small quadcopters were mainly in the hands of special forces and a few field intelligence units, not standard platoons . That changed abruptly when the IDF found itself engaged in intense urban combat in Gaza’s dense cities and Hamas’s subterranean tunnel networks. The unique high-stakes environment – heavy civilian presence, booby-trapped buildings, and ambushes from below and above – “required fast solutions,” and tactical drones were rapidly introduced to regular fighting units in creative ways .
Israeli infantry began using mini-drones as extensions of their soldiers’ senses and firepower. Units cleared tight urban blocks by flying small quadcopters ahead to see around corners and down alleyways, scouting for ambushes so that troops didn’t blunder into kill-zones . Micro-drones were sent into Hamas tunnels and basements, acting as remote scouts in the most dangerous spaces. Some drones were even used offensively – providing cover fire from unexpected angles, breaking windows or clearing rooms, and functioning as loitering munitions (“kamikaze” drones) to take out gunmen behind cover . In essence, the IDF leveraged drones to do the “dull, dirty, and dangerous” tasks of urban warfare, sparing human soldiers from the first exposure to threats.
Israel’s defense industry raced to supply new tools. A whole “menagerie” of small tactical drones entered service virtually at once – models like the Elbit Lanius (a lethal quadcopter nicknamed after a shrike), Rafael’s Spike FireFly (Maoz) loitering munition, SpearUAV’s Ninox drone for infantry, and others all saw action in Gaza . Observers noted that even five years ago such proliferation of drones at platoon level would have seemed far-fetched; now “drones proliferate like a menagerie of animals at all levels of the army”, as one commentary put it . In one notable adaptation, IDF reservists in the 55th Paratroopers Brigade pooled resources to buy over a hundred off-the-shelf drones on their own initiative, rapidly giving their unit a DIY tactical UAS fleet when the war began . This eclectic approach – mixing military-grade systems with modified hobby drones – became a hallmark of Israel’s campaign.
Not only the IDF benefited from drone innovation; their adversary Hamas also demonstrated grim creativity with drones. In the surprise Hamas onslaught of October 7, 2023, militants used more than
100 small commercial quadcopters armed with explosives to disable Israel’s border security. Hamas drones systematically dropped grenades on surveillance towers, communication arrays, and remote machine gun turrets along the Gaza fence, effectively “blinding” Israel’s high-tech border in the first minutes of the attack . Snipers picked off cameras while drones knocked out watchtower sensors, allowing assault teams to storm through breaches with little resistance . Military experts noted Hamas was “closely copying methods used in Ukraine”, where both sides had used cheap quadcopters to attack vehicles and trenches – except Hamas applied it to fixed infrastructure . Footage from that day showed drones even striking Israeli tanks: one video captured
a small drone dropping a munition through a hatch of a 65-ton Merkava IV tank – low-cost tech defeating a multi-million-dollar machine . The scale of Hamas’s drone use was unprecedented for the group (Hamas later claimed it deployed 35 of its homemade “Zouari” drones during the assault) and caught some analysts by surprise . As one Israeli expert observed, it proved that even relatively primitive drones “can be much deadlier in a complex mission than we previously would have admitted” .
In summary, both conflicts have seen an evolutionary leap in small drone warfare driven by those on the frontlines. Ukraine’s war turned civilian drones into widely-used weapons and prompted constant innovation under fire. In Gaza, both the well-equipped IDF and the irregular Hamas fighters leveraged mini-drones for tactical gains in urban combat. Bottom-up adaptation was the catalyst in each case – in Ukraine often led by tech-savvy volunteers and junior officers, and in Gaza by necessity and emulation. This battlefield-driven drone revolution has directly impacted soldier survivability on the ground, as we explore next.
A Ukrainian soldier operates a first-person-view (FPV) attack drone on the frontline. Cheap FPV quadcopters, often modified with explosives, have become ubiquitous and are responsible for a large share of Russian equipment losses and casualties . Frontline drone workshops in Ukraine can repair and even redesign these drones within hours, constantly improving their performance in battle .
Frontline Innovations Improving Survivability
One of the clearest benefits of bottom-up innovation is improved frontline survivability for those implementing these new tactics and technologies. In Ukraine and Israel/Gaza, creative drone use has saved lives by giving troops better intelligence, keeping them out of harm’s way, and neutralizing threats more safely and effectively. Here are several ways in which these grassroots innovations have directly protected soldiers and civilians on the battlefield:
- “Eyes in the Sky” for Safer Maneuver: Perhaps the most obvious advantage is real-time reconnaissance. Before entering a dangerous area, infantry can send up a small quadcopter to scout ahead, identifying enemy positions, ambushes, or booby traps. Ukrainian units have used drone surveillance to map trenches and spot Russian units in real time, allowing them to avoid walking into kill zones or to call in artillery precisely on threats . In Israel’s urban battles, this has been lifesaving – IDF soldiers use palm-sized drones to peek around corners in Gaza’s urban “jungle,” checking for militants or IEDs before moving forward . An Israeli officer noted that enhanced situational awareness from small drones is one of the most effective tools for limiting collateral damage and avoiding surprises in urban combat . In essence, drones act as the squad’s expendable forward scout. This dramatically improves survivability, as the first “person” to encounter the enemy in a house or alley is now often a camera on rotors rather than a young conscript in harm’s way.
- Safer Clearing of Tunnels and Buildings: Nowhere is the danger higher than the dark tunnels under Gaza or the confined stairwells of a bombed-out building. Here, troops face traps that can instantly be fatal. Israeli forces adopted mini-drones and even small robots to go first into these deathtraps. For example, Israeli reservists famously acquired three robotic “Ghost” dogs (quadruped robots) with donated funds at the war’s outset, specifically to explore tunnels and inspect dangerous structures ahead of soldiers . Sending an unmanned ground drone or a hovering camera drone into a tunnel can locate booby traps or armed fighters, allowing sappers to neutralize threats without exposing Israeli sappers or infantry initially. This bottom-up initiative to procure tunnel drones was driven by reservists’ battlefield experience and has likely spared lives in the grueling underground combat.
- Precision Strikes with Minimal Exposure: Small drones have given even light infantry a stand- off strike capability that reduces the need for risky close-quarters fights. In Ukraine, soldiers rig simple quadcopters to drop grenades directly into enemy trenches, foxholes or open tank hatches, killing or dispersing enemy troops without a direct firefight. By hitting Russian positions from above, Ukrainian defenders and recon units can eliminate snipers or machine gun nests that would otherwise pin them down . The drones effectively perform the first strike, often forcing enemies to take cover or flee, after which Ukrainian troops can advance with lower risk. On the offensive, first-person-view kamikaze drones lead the way by taking out heavy armor or bunkers, so that human assault teams face a weakened enemy. General Zaluzhnyi, Ukraine’s top commander, noted that an expanding 10–15 km-wide “zone of continuous death” created by ubiquitous drones has sharply curtailed Russian advances, “limiting [the enemy] while preserving Ukraine’s soldiers” . In other words, cheap drones form a protective lethal buffer in front of Ukrainian units, blunting attacks so effectively that fewer Ukrainian lives are lost holding the line .
- Rapid Medical and Supply Delivery: Survival isn’t only about combat – it’s also about getting critical supplies and aid under fire. Here too, bottom-up ingenuity with drones has helped. Ukrainian forces have repurposed drones to carry ammunition, food, water, and medical kits to forward positions, reducing the need for risky supply runs by humans . In some instances, small quadcopters or unmanned ground vehicles have evacuated blood samples or even ferried small wounded casualties out of contested zones, though such cases are rare. The concept is promising: if a soldier is pinned down and bleeding, a drone might deliver a tourniquet or blood packet faster (and more safely) than a medic running through shellfire. By taking soldiers out of these dangerous resupply or messenger roles, drones have likely saved many from sniper fire or bombardment. This is an innovative adaptation of technology to improve frontline endurance and survivability, dreamed up not by central logistics planners but by field units desperate to solve immediate problems.
- Psychological Edge and Lower Casualties: Finally, the knowledge that one has drone support can alter soldiers’ risk calculus. Troops with a live drone feed overhead are less likely to stumble into an enemy or be flanked, increasing their confidence and reducing panic. Conversely, the enemy’s morale suffers – Russian troops complain of relentless Ukrainian drone observations and strikes, creating constant stress and uncertainty . This psychological effect indirectly protects friendly forces: a demoralized, drone-wary opponent is more prone to mistakes or hesitation, giving well-coordinated units the upper hand without necessarily resorting to high- risk heroics. Moreover, drone footage is used for quick after-action reviews and learning, so units adapt tactics faster and avoid repeating deadly mistakes. In sum, the integration of drones at the small-unit level – an innovation driven largely from the bottom up – has “given commanders unparalleled situational awareness”, enabling tactical decisions “with precision and responsiveness unattainable ten years ago” . It is no exaggeration to say this has saved lives and will be a standard expectation for future soldiers.
Of course, technology is no panacea – casualties in both Ukraine and Gaza remain tragically high. But frontline-driven drone innovations have undoubtedly tilted the balance in favor of the innovators’ survivability. An illustrative data point: in early 2025, Russian offensives in Ukraine slowed by 45% compared to late 2024, yet their casualty rates only dropped 10%, as they continued bleeding against Ukraine’s “drone wall” defense . Drones did not single-handedly halt the fighting, but they made attacks far more costly for the attacker and gave defenders new ways to stay alive and lethal. In
urban Gaza, the IDF’s heavy use of drones for surveillance likely prevented countless ambushes and civilian casualties by revealing threats and allowing more measured strikes. As one Israeli military tech official noted, even if small drones are technologically simple, when used in a coordinated, clever way “they can be much deadlier…than we previously would have admitted” – and deadlier to the enemy in war often translates to safer for your side.
From Government Procurement to Grassroots Supply Chains
One of the most remarkable shifts accompanying this bottom-up drone revolution is who is supplying the technology. Traditionally, armies acquire weapons through top-down procurement: generals determine needs, governments fund contracts with defense firms, and equipment is delivered in years or decades. In these conflicts, that model has been upended by urgency and the widespread availability of commercial tech. Soldiers, volunteers, and private citizens have stepped up to directly source and even manufacture the drones they need, creating new grassroots supply chains alongside (and sometimes in place of) official channels.
This shift has been most dramatic in Ukraine. Since 2014, and especially after 2022, Ukrainian civil society and diaspora networks have mobilized to equip their military at a speed the state bureaucracy couldn’t match. Crowdfunding campaigns have bought everything from sniper rifles to medical kits – and drones quickly became the hottest commodity. “Crowdfunding has long been a pillar of Ukraine’s war effort,” one Business Insider report noted, with civilians pitching in for years to send equipment to the front, but “low-cost drones…have become one of the hottest commodities among units” fighting Russia . In many Ukrainian units, “most funding [for drones] is from volunteer help, by donors”, according to an officer in a drone unit, whereas government funds are used for basics like ammunition . This informal pipeline meant that when frontline fighters realized they needed dozens or hundreds of quadcopters, they didn’t wait for Kyiv’s permission – they hopped on Facebook or Telegram, appealed to supporters, and drones arrived in days.
Examples of this phenomena abound. In mid-2022, a Ukrainian charity crowdfunded over $20 million in a matter of weeks to purchase several Bayraktar TB2 armed drones for the military – only for the Turkish manufacturer to ultimately donate the drones for free, given the overwhelming public support. The Serhiy Prytula Foundation, run by a comedian-turned-activist, famously raised $5.5 million in nine hours to buy 50 battlefield reconnaissance armored vehicles for the army . “It is…just the latest example of the extraordinary scale and speed of crowdfunding campaigns that have been powering the Ukrainian military since the early days of the war,” the Guardian observed in late 2022 . Prytula’s team noted with pride that they were the first to procure heavy military gear as an NGO and gift it to the Ministry of Defense – essentially performing a role traditionally reserved for state procurement arms .
On the drone front, volunteers established dedicated initiatives like the “Army of Drones” program, which solicited donations of off-the-shelf drones or cash to buy them worldwide. Ukrainian tech enthusiasts and garage tinkerers formed workshops to build custom drones from scratch. Across Ukraine, volunteers and small workshops fuel a grassroots drone-building movement that supplies frontline troops with cheap, effective FPV attack drones . These range from 3D-printed drone components churned out in basement labs to SMEs (small enterprises) converting existing hobby models for greater payloads. The result is a flourishing cottage industry of war-startups: one volunteer drone maker quipped that “no U.S. company is keeping up with Ukraine” when it comes to rapid battlefield drone innovation . Western experts and even defense companies have taken note – American firms are now turning to Ukrainian drone designers for inspiration and partnering with them, recognizing that Ukraine’s battlefield-driven R&D cycle is far more agile than the Pentagon’s traditional process .
Even Russia, despite a more centralized military, has seen a grassroots supply effort emerge. Soldiers and their families often pool money on Russian crowdfunding sites to buy DJI drones, thermal imagers, and other kit that isn’t reaching them fast enough through official channels . Russian nationalist bloggers have organized donation drives for quadcopters to send to units at the front. This bottom-up supply effort on the Russian side, however, appears smaller in scale and often born out of desperation to compensate for logistical shortfalls, whereas in Ukraine it has become a defining strength. Ukraine’s defense ministry essentially embraced the volunteer movement – easing import rules, coordinating with NGO purchase efforts, and even integrating volunteer drone units (like the famed Aerorozvidka aerial reconnaissance team that began as a hobbyist group) into the official force structure.
In Israel’s case, the standing military is well-funded, but the Gaza conflict’s immediate demands still saw ad-hoc acquisition. We saw earlier how reserve units bought their own commercial drones en masse.
In addition, Israeli civilians and companies have been donating gear like flashlights, helmets, and drones to support frontline units, especially during the first weeks of fighting in 2023 when regular supply chains were scrambling. High-tech Israeli firms with relevant products (robotics, drones, sensors) volunteered them for testing on short notice. The spontaneous blending of civilian tech and military need was evident. For instance, as mentioned, reservists obtained cutting-edge robotic dogs from a U.S. vendor via donation to experiment with tunnel clearing . And when off-the-shelf Chinese DJI drones proved useful, the IDF did not hesitate to buy more – DJI notably halted sales to Ukraine and Russia in 2022 due to reports of military use , but continued selling to Israel, where its Agras agricultural drones and Mavic cameras were promptly repurposed for combat . Rather than a formal procurement program to develop “IDF tactical drone X”, the Israeli military pragmatically took what was available (a crop-sprayer or a hobby drone) and modified it in theatre.
This rapid bottom-up acquisition has, in many ways, outpaced the traditional top-down system. It raises some important questions: How can military organizations ensure quality control and interoperability when gear comes from everywhere? Are there risks in relying on donations that might dry up? Ukraine has mitigated some issues by setting technical standards and coordinating volunteer outputs to avoid, say, ten incompatible drone types at one brigade. But overall, the grassroots supply has been a lifeline. It also has strategic significance: it signals huge public buy-in and morale when citizens rally to buy drones for their army. As a BBC documentary noted, crowdfunding arms isn’t new (even in WWII, the British public funded Spitfire planes), but the scale in Ukraine is unprecedented .
In a broader sense, these conflicts have demonstrated a new ecosystem of warfare supply. One where Twitter and Telegram may be as important as official logistics channels, where an innovative idea in a field workshop can get crowdfunded and mass-produced in weeks, and where NGOs function as arms dealers (in a positive sense) for a nation at war. It represents a democratization of military power – tapping the creativity, funding, and enthusiasm of the populace directly for the war effort. The success of this model in Ukraine’s case – helping the underdog field thousands of drones and other critical tech quickly – suggests that future conflicts will see more of this “society in uniform” approach. Traditional defense contractors and procurement officials are certainly paying attention, because the implications for the future of warfare and force preparation are profound.
Implications for Future Warfare
The bottom-up drone revolution in Ukraine and the Middle East is not a one-off anomaly; it foreshadows a new paradigm of war in the 21st century. The experiences from these conflicts carry several strategic and tactical implications that militaries around the world are already grappling with:
- Speed and Adaptability Trump Procurement Cycles: In fast-moving conflicts, the side that can innovate and deploy new technology fastest gains a significant edge. Ukraine’s military, by embracing rapid frontline innovation, has been able to outpace a larger adversary in certain domains. As General Zaluzhnyi observed, “victory on the battlefield now depends entirely on the ability to outpace the enemy in technological development.” This is a stark shift from the past, when superior numbers or firepower could compensate for slower adaptation. Now, if your enemy is fielding a new drone tactic today, you’d better have a counter or equivalent by tomorrow. Bureaucratic, top-heavy militaries risk defeat if they cannot emulate this agility. The U.S. Department of Defense, for example, has launched a new initiative called “Replicator” aimed at quickly fielding thousands of low-cost, autonomous drones across air, land, and sea – explicitly drawing lessons from Ukraine’s success with attritable drones . The Pentagon’s first wave of Replicator projects, from loitering munitions to counter-drone systems, “may well have [Ukrainians] saying, ‘Hey, that’s what we’re doing.’” Indeed, Defense One noted that Replicator’s focus on swarming drones “echoes Ukraine’s efforts – improvised and otherwise – to fend off Russia’s uncrewed weapons” . Future wars will favor those who can iterate new tech and tactics in near real-time, often leveraging COTS (commercial off-the-shelf) technology in creative ways.
- The Return of Mass and the “Attritable” Mindset: For decades, advanced militaries trended towards ever more expensive, few-in-number platforms (think $100 million jets or large warships). The drone wars suggest a course correction: quantity has a quality of its own when each unit is cheap but effective. Ukraine has shown that $500 hobby drones or $5,000 kamikaze drones can destroy $5 million tanks and even $1.5 billion navy ships . This flips the cost calculus and favors those willing to use masses of expendable systems. U.S. Army Chief of Staff Gen. Randy George noted Ukraine “demonstrated the value of small, attritable drones on the battlefield.” We’re likely entering an era where militaries will field “drone swarms” and large numbers of simple robotic platforms alongside traditional assets. These expendable drones can perform dangerous tasks without risking a pilot or elite commando – and if they get shot down, the material loss is minor. Strategically, countries are already investing in domestic drone manufacturing to secure this supply; Ukraine is expanding its drone production to “build a massive drone arsenal on a budget” , and European nations are following suit to avoid being left behind . Expect future force structures to include entire units dedicated to unmanned systems at the lowest echelons, and doctrine evolving to integrate waves of cheap drones in both offense and defense.
- Changing Combined-Arms Tactics: The proliferation of drones has begun to rewrite the rules of tactics that have held since WWII. As noted, tanks and armored vehicles – the backbone of ground offensives for a century – have become far more vulnerable. “Armored vehicles…have become defenseless against cheap drones” in open battlefield use, Zaluzhnyi warned . This doesn’t render tanks obsolete, but it means combined-arms formations must now include robust anti-drone measures and likely operate very differently (e.g. dispersed, under electronic warfare cover, relying on infantry-operated drones for protection). Artillery and air power also see shifts: counter-battery fire is quicker when drones spot for guns, and traditional attack helicopters have struggled to survive where small drones and MANPADS proliferate. The battlefield is becoming “the era of the cautious tank” and the camouflaged, constantly moving unit . Commanders will need to adjust by emphasizing concealment, electronic countermeasures, and rapid maneuver – essentially assuming that the enemy is always watching from above. We also see the emergence of completely new tactics: drone-vs-drone dogfights in the sky, drones used as bait to reveal enemy positions, and even drones coordinating with each other (semi-autonomously) in swarms. This requires training at the small-unit level so every soldier is aware of drone capabilities and counters. Armies are already shifting training; some experts suggest every infantryman may need to be a drone operator or at least savvy in drone use, an idea dubbed “Every Soldier a Sensor/Operator.”
- The Human Element and Decentralized Initiative: One might think more autonomy and drones mean less human importance, but the opposite is true: human ingenuity and decentralization become even more critical. The successful use of these tools in Ukraine and Israel was not automatic – it depended on a culture that allowed junior leaders to experiment and act on their initiative. Future forces will need to empower young officers, NCOs, and even privates to propose and test innovations without waiting for endless approvals. Rigid hierarchies that stifle bottom-up feedback will struggle in a fast-paced tech-driven fight. The Israeli experience in Gaza showed that when reservists brought in new ideas (like attaching improvised explosive charges to small drones to clear sniper hideouts), the command that listened and adapted gained an edge . Similarly, Ukraine’s decentralized mission command – giving units latitude to solve problems – has been credited with many battlefield innovations. A key implication is that military organizations must cultivate flexibility, creative problem-solving, and technical literacy at all levels. Those still geared toward 20th-century top-down command may find themselves painfully outmatched by a “start-up army” that crowdsources solutions in days. The Mars Adapting framework discussed earlier essentially becomes doctrine: learning and adapting continuously as an organization is itself a core competency in modern war .
- Broader Participation in National Defense: Finally, the blending of civilian and military efforts seen in these conflicts may portend a future where society as a whole is more directly involved in a nation’s defense during war. Crowdfunding weapons, open-source intelligence gathering by amateurs, tech companies pushing updates to help military drones – these blur the lines between the front and the home front. Strategically, this could mean that an aggressor not only faces an opponent’s army but its entire population empowered by technology. Nations are likely to establish frameworks to better harness civilian innovation in war (and to guard against the security risks that come with it). One can imagine formal reservist tech units or innovation hubs that act as bridges between the armed forces and civilian tech communities. Conversely, countries need to anticipate that their adversaries might do the same, and plan for a conflict environment where critical tech and supply lines might come from distributed civilian networks rather than centralized depots. This raises legal and ethical questions (are civilian drone builders lawful targets?), but those debates lag behind reality on the ground.
In conclusion, the bottom-up drone innovations in Ukraine and Israel–Gaza have heralded a new era of warfare. They demonstrate that with determination, creativity, and grassroots support, even a smaller force can adapt and punch above its weight against a larger foe. The old top-down model of military innovation – while still necessary for big leaps – has been disrupted by the swift improvisation of those in contact with the enemy. The future will belong to militaries that can combine the best of both worlds: top-down vision and resources with bottom-up ingenuity and agility. As one U.S. major put it, front-line innovators don’t lack ideas or motivation; “they must persevere through countless experiments and failures… unlocking the power of innovation” at the edge . The task for top-down leadership is to embrace that chaos constructively, scaling up the good ideas quickly and amplifying the soldiers’ resourcefulness into institutional strength.
Wars will continue to be won or lost by people, but those people will increasingly be augmented by swarms of smart, expendable machines largely shaped by their own hands. The lesson from the steppes of Ukraine and the rubble of Gaza is clear: adapt or die – and the adapting is happening from the ground up.
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van der Vorm, M. (2022, April 26). Learning in conflict: Reviewing “Mars Adapting”. The Strategy Bridge. https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2022/4/26/learning-in-conflict-reviewing-mars-adapting
Defense One – Peniston, B., & Skove, S. (2024, May 6). New details give Replicator a distinct Ukrainian flavor. Defense One. https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2024/05/new-details-give-replicator- distinct-ukrainian-flavor/396344/
Defense Acquisition University – Schreiner, W. B., & Riel, D. (2020, Oct). A bottom-up, innovative approach for delivering what we need now. Defense Acquisition Research Journal, 27(5). https://www.dau.edu/ library/damag/2020/Bottom-Up-Innovative-Approach (For concept of bottom-up vs top-down innovation)
CSIS – Bondar, K., & Bendett, S. (2023). The Russia-Ukraine drone war: Innovation on the frontlines and beyond (Event transcript). Center for Strategic & International Studies. https://www.csis.org/analysis/ russia-ukraine-drone-war-innovation-frontlines-and-beyond (Cited for commentary on frontline acquisition of drones)
A Case Study on Integrating Tactical Drones: Israel – Modern War
Institute
Learning in Conflict #Reviewing Mars Adapting
A Bottom-Up, Innovative Approach for Delivering What We Need Now | www.dau.edu
The Russia-Ukraine Drone War: Innovation on the Frontlines
and Beyond
Ukrainian innovations are redefining the role of drones in modern war – Atlantic
Council
Innovating Under Fire: Lessons from Ukraine’s Frontline Drone Workshops – Modern War
Institute
Ukraine’s Battlefield Drone Innovations are Influencing Europe’s Militaries | Small Wars Journal by Arizona State University https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/06/11/ukraines-battlefield-drone-innovations/
How Hamas broke through Israel’s border defenses during Oct. 7 attack – The Washington Post
Hamas: Learning about drone warfare from the war in Ukraine – DW – 10/20/2023
Ukraine’s Crowdfunded Dronemakers Say They Can Smash Russia for Cheap – Business Insider https://www.businessinsider.com/ukraine-dronemakers-war-unwinnable-dirt-cheap-crowdfunding-veterans-civilians- russia-2024-12
‘A joke that went out of control’: crowdfunding weapons for Ukraine’s war | Ukraine | The
Guardian
Israel retrofitting DJI commercial drones to bomb and surveil Gaza | Israel-Palestine conflict News | Al Jazeera
Pentagon backs Ukraine-style push for small drone adoption
New details give Replicator a distinct Ukrainian flavor – Defense One
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